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A Manifestation of Self-reconstruction and Reformation
A Manifestation of Self-reconstruction and Reformation by: Dr. Ali Shariati
Muhammad Iqbal
If one were to reconstruct the form of Islam, which has been made to
degenerate over the course of history, re-assemble it in such a way that its
spirit could return to a complete body, and transform the present
disorientated elements of Islam into that spirit, as if the trumpet of
Israfil were to blow in the 20th century over a dead society and awaken its
movement, power, spirit, and meaning, it is then that exemplary Muslim
personalities like Muhammad Iqbal would be reconstructed and reborn.
Muhammad Iqbal is not just a Muslim mystic who is solely concerned with
mysticism or gnosis as were Ghazzali, Muhyi Din ibn Arabi, and Rumi. They
emphasized individual evolution, purification of the soul, and the inner
illuminated 'self'. They only developed and trained a few people like
themselves but, for the most part, remained oblivious to the outside world,
having been almost unaware of the Mongol attack and the subsequent despotic
rule and suppression of the people.
Iqbal is also not like Abu Muslim, Hasan Sabah or Saladin Ayyubi and
personalities like them who, in the history of Islam, are simply men of the
sword, power, war, and struggle and who consider the exercise of power and
the defeat of the enemy enough to effect reform and revolution in the minds
of the people and in their social relationships.
Nor is Iqbal similar to those learned individuals like Sir Sayyid Ahmad
Khan, who imagined that no matter in what situation Islamic society is (even
if it is under the domination of a British viceroy), it can be revived with
modern scholarly interpretations or with 20th century scientific and logical
commentaries on Islamic tenets and Quranic verses, as well as through
profound philosophical and scholarly research.
Iqbal is not among some Western people who consider science to be sufficient
for human salvation, for evolution, and for curing anguish. He is not one of
those philosophers who thinks meeting economic needs is tantamount to meeting
all human needs. Nor is he like his fellow countrymen, that is, the great
Hindu and Buddhist thinkers who consider peace of mind and spiritual
salvation to be transmigration, or who consider the cycle of kanna to
Nirvana to be the fulfillment of the mission of humanity, and who imagine
that in a society where there is even one hungry person, where slavery,
deprivation and disgrace exist, one can still develop pure, elevated spirits
and disciplined, educated people who have attained well-being and even a
sense of morality !
No. Iqbal demonstrates through his very being and through his School of
Thought that thoughts which are related to Islam are thoughts which, while
paying careful attention to this world and the material needs of humanity,
also give the human being a heart. As he himself says, "I find the most
beautiful states of life during the yearnings and meditations between
daybreak and dawn."
He is a great mystic, with a pure spirit, delivered from materialism and, at
the same time, a man who respects and honors science, technological progress,
and the advancement of human reason in our age. He is not a thinker who
debases science, reason, and scientific advancement having had his emotions
aroused by Sufism, Christianity, the religion of Lao Tzu, or
Buddha. Neither is he a proponent of "dry" factual science like the science
of Francis Bacon or Claude Bernard, which is limited to the discovery of the
relationships between phenomena or material manifestations and the employment
of natural forces for material life. At the same time, he is not a thinker
who links philosophy, illumination, science, religion, reason, and
revelation together in an incongruous way, as some have done. Rather, in his
outlook and attitude towards this world, he regards reason and science in the
very sense they are understood today as allies of love, emotion, and
inspiration in the evolution of the human spirit, but he does not accept
their goals.
The greatest advice of Iqbal to humanity is: Have a heart like Jesus,
thought like Socrates, and a hand like the hand of a Caesar, but all in one
human being, in one creature of humanity, based upon one spirit in order to
attain one goal. That is, to be like Iqbal himself: A man who attains the
height of political awareness in his time to the extent that some people
believe him to be solely a political figure and a liberated, nationalist
leader who is a 20th century anti-colonialist. A man who, in philosophical
thought, rises to such a high level that he is considered to be a
contemporary thinker and philosopher of the same rank as Bergson in the West
today or of the same level as Ghazzali in Islamic history.
At the same time, he is a man we regard as being a reformer of Islamic
society, who thinks about the conditions of human and Islamic society, a
society in which he himself lives and for which he performs jihad (i.e.
struggles nobly in the way of God) for the salvation, awareness, and
liberation of Muslim people. His efforts are not just casual and scientific
or of the kind that Sartre called "intellectual demonstrations of political,
pseudo-leftists" but rather of the kind exhibited by responsible individuals.
He struggles and strives and, at the same time, he is also a lover of Rumi.
He journeys with him in his spiritual ascensions and burns from the lover's
flames, anguishes, and spiritual anxieties. This great man does not become
one-dimensional, does not disintegrate, does not become a one-sided or
one-dimensional Muslim. He is a complete Muslim. Even though he loves Rumi,
he is not obliterated by him.
Iqbal goes to Europe and becomes a philosopher. He comes to know the
European Schools of philosophy and makes them known to others. Everyone
admits that he is a 20th-century philosopher, but he does not surrender to
Western thinking. On the contrary, he conquers the West. He lives with a
critical mind and the power of choice in the 20th century and in the Western
civilization. He is devoted to and a disciple of Rumi to an extent that does
not contradict and is not incompatible with the authentic dimensions of the
Islamic spirit.
Sufism says "As our fate has been pre-determined in our absence, if it is
not to your satisfaction, do not complain". Or, "If the world does not agree
with you or suit you, you should agree with the world". But Iqbal, the
mystic, says "If the world does not agree with you, arise against it!". "The
world" means the destiny and life of human beings. The human being is a wave,
not a static shoreline. His or her being and becoming is in motion. What do I
mean? It is to be in motion. In the mysticism of Iqbal, which is neither
Hindu mysticism nor religious fanaticism, but Quranic mysticism, the human
being must change the world. Quranic Islam has substituted "heavenly fate" in
which the human being is nothing, with "human fate" in which the
human being plays an important role. This is the greatest revolutionary, as
well as progressive and constructive principle which Islam has created by its
world view, philosophy of life, and ethics.
The greatest criticism that humanism and liberal intellectuals have leveled
and continue to level against religion is that religious beliefs have been
interpreted as being founded on absolute determinism or Divine Will, and thus
the absolute subjugation of human will, so the human being is logically
reduced to being weak in terms of free-choice in relation to the Absolute.
If this were true, it would be a disgrace. It would be servitude and a means
for the negation of power, freedom, and responsibility. It would be to submit
to the status quo, to 'whatever will be, will be', to accept any fate which
is imposed upon the human being in this world and to admit to the futility
and uselessness of life. As past, present, and future events have been and
will continue to be dictated by fate, in this view, any criticism or
objection, then, or efforts to attain our hearts' desires or to change
the situation, must be subjugated to "whatever has been pre-destined for
us". In this way, the human being's attempts to change, convert, and amend
the status quo become impossible, unreasonable, and ill-advised.
But in the philosophy of Islam, although the One God has Absolute Power and
is Almighty and although for Him is the Creation, Guidance, Expediency, and
Rule over the universe, "His is the Creation and the Command." (7:54), at the
same time, the human being, in this extensive universe, is considered in such
a way that while one cannot dissociate oneself from the rule of God and
from Divine Sovereignty, one can live freely. A Muslim has free will and the
power to rebel and surrender. Thus, he or she is responsible and the maker of
his or her own image. "Every soul is held in pledge for what he earns"
(74:38). "And the human being shall have nothing but what he strives for"
(53:30).
In his mystic journey with the Quran, Iqbal described this principle, that
is, the principle of authenticity of deed and responsibility towards human
beings, that which humanists, existentialists, or radicals endeavor to help
humanity achieve by negating religion and denying God. These people, quite
rightly, see the religion and the God conceived by the minds of human beings
to be incompatible with human freedom, esteem, authenticity, and
responsibility, whereas Islam, without resorting to philosophical
justification and interpretation, clearly declares "the day when the human
being shall see what his two hands have sent before" (78:40).
With his outlook, his orientation to faith and his Islamic mysticism, Iqbal
passed through all the philosophical and spiritual states of this age. It can
be said that he was a Muslim migrant who appeared in the depths of the Indian
Ocean and rose to the highest peaks of honor of the majestic European
mountains, but he did not remain there. He returned to us to offer his nation
- that is, to offer us - whatever he had learned on his wondrous journey.
Through his personality, I see that once again Islam in the 20th
century presents a model, an example, for the anguished but confused new
generation which has some degree of self-awareness. A shining spirit, full of
Eastern inspiration, is selected from the land of the heart of spiritual
culture and illumination. The great thoughts of the West, the land of
civilization, intellect, and knowledge with the power of creativity and
advancement are placed in his mind. Then, with all of this investment, he
becomes knowledgeable of the 20th century. He is not one of those
reactionaries and worshippers of the past who have enmity towards the West
and whatever is new; who oppose new civilization without a sound reason. He
is also not like those who imitate and are absorbed by the West without
having the courage to criticize and to choose. On the one hand, he employs
science and, on the other, he senses its inadequacies and shortcomings in
meeting the spiritual needs and the evolutionary requirements of humanity. He
offers solutions for its completion. Iqbal is a person who has a world view,
and he has developed philosophical-spiritual interpretations based upon it
which he offers to the world and its people. Iqbal is a person who bases his
social teaching upon his world view, and then offers his spiritual
and philosophical interpretations of it. Based upon the culture and history
with which he is associated, he develops the concept of a person based on the
standard of an "Ali", to the extent that the material for developing such a
human being in our century allows.
What does the "standard of Ali" mean? It means a human being with an Eastern
heart and a Western mind. It means a person who thinks deeply and profoundly.
It means a human being who expresses a beautiful and splendid love. It refers
to a person who is well acquainted with the anguish of the spirit as well as
with the sufferings of life. It means a human being who both knows God and
the people. It is a devotee possessing the light of knowledge who burns with
love and faith, and whose penetrating eyes never allow negligence and
ignorance to prevail without questioning the fate of enslaved nations. It is
a person who seeks reform, revolution, and a change of mental attitudes. As a
thinker, he realizes that the spiritless eye of science (according to Francis
Bacon) is incapable of seeing all the realities of the universe. He also
feels that a lovesick heart attains nothing if it is only concerned with
asceticism, self-abasement and purification, because a human being affiliated
with society and affiliated
to life and the material world cannot disentangle the "self" alone. An
individual moves with the caravan of society and cannot choose a way separate
from it.
This is why we wish to have a School of thought and action which both
responds to our philosophical needs, and at the same time develops a thinking
being who is accepted by the world, recognized by civilization and the new
culture of the world, and not one alienated from us and our rich cultural
resources. We wish for a School of thought and action which nurtures a human
being who is closely aware of our culture and all of our good spiritual and
religious assets, who is not alienated from the times,
and who does not live in the 4th or 5th century. We long for it to develop a
human being who can think, who has a scientific mind, yet who does not remain
negligent of the anguish, life, captivity, and hardships of his people. We
desire the development of a human being who, even if he thinks about the real
and material anguish of humanity and about the present confusions and
difficulties of human society or his own society, does not forget the ideal
human being or the significance of the human being or the eternal mission of
humanity in history, and does not lower all human ideals to the level of
material consumption.
All that we seek in these various domains can be found in Iqbal, because the
only thing that Iqbal did - and this is the greatest success of Iqbal as a
Muslim in an Islamic society in the 20th century - was that, based upon the
knowledge he had of the rich new and old cultures, he was able to develop
himself, based on the model which his ideological School, - that is, Islam, -
gave. This is the greatest success of Iqbal in an Islamic society in the 20th
century. We do not say that he is a perfect human being. No. We do not say he
is a symbolic person. No. He is a personality who, after his disintegration,
had been reconstructed into a complete Muslim person and a perfect Islamic
personality in the 20th century. This reconstruction is the starting point
from which we Muslim intellectuals must ourselves begin. We must feel our
greatest responsibility to be in reconstructing ourselves and our society.
Sayyid Jamal was the first who produced such a feeling of re-awakening.
Asking "Who are you? Who were you?", Iqbal was the first fruit from the seed
of the movement which Sayyid Jamal planted in this people. The first product
is a great model, an example, and our very awaken- ing. As Easterners, we are
affiliated to this part of the world. We are connected
with this history. We are human beings confronted by nature and by the West.
But what do we mean when we say Iqbal was a reformer? Can reform really save
a society from all of its misfortunes, anguish, and difficulties? Must not a
sudden, severe, deep-rooted revolution take place in thought and in relation
to society? When we say Iqbal was a reformer, those present who are familiar
with the expressions prevalent among the educated class think "reform" means
something which is the opposite of "revolution" in a socio-political sense.
Most often when we say "reform", we mean gradual change or change in the
superstructure, and when we say "revolution", we mean a sudden,
reconstruction. But when in these changes we say that Iqbal was a reformer,
we are not referring to slow and gradual change in society. Our intention is
not gradual change or external reform, but we use this word in its general
sense which also includes the meaning of "revolution".
When we say Iqbal was a reformer or that the great thinkers after Sayyid
Jamal are known for being the greatest reformers of the century in the world,
it is not in the sense that they supported gradual and external change in
society. No! They were supporters of a deep-seated revolution, a revolution
in thought, in views, in feelings; an ideological and cultural revolution.
Iqbal, Sayyid Jamal, Kawakibi, Muhammad Abduh, Ibn Ibrahim and members of the
Maqrib lJlama Association are great men who shook the East in the last one
hundred years. Their reforms or, still better, "reforming revolutions", stand
upon this principle, for they believe that individual reform is no longer an
answer. It is an altogether different matter if reform affects society. A
person can no longer think and live in a way which he has chosen for himself,
nor accept any influence from his age or his society, and still develop
himself into a pure and real human being in a corrupt age and in a degenerate
society, for if this were to be possible, then "social responsibility and
commitment" would make no sense
Regarding the Qadiani (Ahmadiyya) Movement
(This Statement was produced in 1936 to Clarify Dr. Iqbal's position and request the non-Muslim Governor of India to declare the Qadianis a non-Muslim minority
On the appearance of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru's three articles in The Modern Review of Calcutta, I received a number of letters from Muslims of different shades of religious and political opinion. Some writers of these letters want me to further elucidate and justify the attitude of the Indian Muslims towards the Ahmadis. Others ask me what exactly I regard as the issue
involved in Ahmadism. In this statement I propose first to meet these demands which I regard as perfectly legitimate, and then to answer the questions raised by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. I fear, however, that parts of this statement may not interest the Pandit, and to save his time I suggest that he may skip over such parts.
It is hardly necessary for me to say that I welcome the Pandit's interest in what I regard as one of the greatest problems of the East and perhaps of the
whole world. He is,I believe, the first Nationalist Indian leader who has expressed a desire to understand the present spiritual unrest in the world of Islam. In view of the many aspects and possible reactions of this unrest, it is highly desirable that thoughtful Indian political leaders should open their mind to the real meaning of what is at the present moment agitating the heart of Islam
I do not wish, however, to conceal the fact, either from the Pandit or from any other reader of this statement, that the Pandit's articles have for the moment given my mind rather a painful conflict of feelings. Knowing him to be a man of wide cultural sympathies, my mind cannot but incline to the view that his desire to understand the questions he has raised is perfectly genuine; yet the way which he has expressed himself betrays a psychology which I find difficult to attribute to him. I am inclined to think that my statement on Qadianism - no more than a mere exposition of a religious doctrine on modern lines - has embarrassed both the Pandit and the Qadianis,
perhaps because both inwardly resent, for different reasons, the prospects of Muslim political and religious solidarity particularly in India. It is
obvious that the Indian Nationalist whose political idealism has practically
nervous by the political awakening of the Indian Muslims, because they feel that the rise in political prestige of the Indian Muslims is sure to defeat their designs to carve out from the Ummat of the Arabian Prophet a new Ummat for the Indian prophet. It is no small surprise to me that my effort to impress on the Indian Muslims the extreme necessity of internal cohesion in the present critical moment of their history in India, and my warning them against the forces of disintegration, masquerading as Reformist movements,
should have given the Pandit an occasion to sympathize with such forces....
Only a true lover of God can appreciate the value of devotion even though it is directed to gods in which he himself does not believe. The folly of our
preachers of toleration consists in describing the attitude of the man who is jealous of the boundaries of his own faith as one of intolerance. They wrongly consider this attitude as a sign of moral inferiority. They do not understand that the value of his attitude, is essentially biological. Where the members of a group feel, either instinctively or on the basis of rational argument, that the corporate life of the social organism to which they belong is in danger, their defensive attitude must be appraised in reference mainly
to a biological criterion. Every thought or deed in this connection must be judged by the life-value that it may possess. The question in this case is
not whether the attitude of an individual or community towards the man who is declared to be a heretic is morally good or bad. The question is whether it is life-giving or life-destroying. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru seems to think that a society founded on religious principles necessitates the institution of Inquisition. This is indeed true of the history of Christianity; but the history of Islam, contrary to the Pandit's logic, shows that during the last thirteen hundred years of the life of Islam, the institution of Inquisition has been absolutely unknown in Muslim countries. The Qur'an expressly prohibits such an institution: "Do not seek out the shortcomings of others and carry not tales against your brethren." Indeed the Pandit will find from the history of Islam that the Jews and Christians, fleeing from religious persecution in their own lands, always found shelter in the lands of Islam.
The two propositions on which the conceptual structure of Islam is based are so simple that it makes heresy in the sense of turning the heretic outside the fold of Islam almost impossible. It is true that when a person declared to be holding heretical doctrines threatens the existing social order an independent Muslim State will certainly take action; but in such a case the action of the State will be determined more by political considerations than by purely religious ones. I can very well realize that a man like the Pandit, who is born and brought up in a society which has no well-defined boundaries and consequently no internal cohesion, finds it difficult to conceive that a religious society can live and prosper without State-appointed commissions of inquiry in so the beliefs of the people. This is quite clear from the passage which he quotes from Cardinal Newman and wonders how far I would accept the application of the Cardinal's dictum to Islam. Let me tell him that there is a tremendous difference between the inner structure of Islam and Catholicism wherein the complexity, the ultra-rational character and the number of dogmas
has, as the history of Christianity shows, always fostered possibilities of fresh heretical interpretations. The simple faith of Muhammad is based on two propositions-that God is One, and that Muhammad is the last of the line of those holy men who have appeared from time to time in all countries and in all ages to guide mankind to the right ways of living. If, as some Christian riters think, a dogma must be defined as an ultra-rational proposition which, for the purpose of securing religious solidarity, must be assented to without any understanding of its metaphysical import, then these two simple propositions of Islam cannot be described even as dogmas; for both of them are supported by the experience of mankind, and are fairly amenable to rational argument. The question of a heresy, which needs the verdict whether
the author of it is within or without the fold, can arise, in the case of a religious society founded on such simple propositions, only when the heretic
rejects both or either of these propositions. Such heresy must be and has been rare in the history of Islam which, while jealous of its frontiers, permits freedom of interpretation within these frontiers. And since the phenomenon of the kind of heresy which affects the boundaries of Islam has
been rare in the history of Islam, the feeling of the average Muslim is naturally intense when a revolt of this kind arises. That is why the feeling
of Muslim Persia was so intense against the Bahais. That is why the feeling of the Indian Muslims is so intense against the Qadianis.
It is true that mutual accusations of heresy for differences in minor points
of law and theology among Muslim religious sects have been rather common. In
this indiscriminate use of the word Kufr, both for minor theological points
of difference as well as for the extreme cases of heresy which involve the
excommunication of the heretic, some present-day educated Muslims, who
possess practically no knowledge of the history of Muslim theological
disputes, see a sign of social and political disintegration of the Muslim
community. This, however, is an entirely wrong notion. The history of Muslim
Theology shows that mutual accusation of heresy on minor points of difference
has, far from working as a disruptive force, actually given an impetus to
synthetic theological thought. "When we read the history of development of
Muhammadan Law," says Professor Hurgronje, "we find that, on the one hand,
the doctors of every age, on the slightest stimulus, condemn one another to
the point of mutual accusations of heresy; and, on the other hand, the very
same people with greater and greater unity of purpose try to reconcile the
similar quarrels of their predecessors." The student of Muslim Theology
knows that among Muslim legists this kind of heresy is technically known as
"heresy below heresy," i.e. the kind of heresy which does not involve the
excommunication of the culprit. It may be admitted, however, that in the
hands of mullas whose intellectual laziness takes all oppositions of
theological thought as absolute and is consequently blind to the unity in
difference, this minor heresy may become a source of great mischief. This
mischief can be remedied only by giving to the students of our theological
schools a clearer vision of the synthetic spirit of Islam, and by
reinitiating them into the function of logical contradiction as a principle
of movement. in theological dialectic. The question of what may be called
major heresy arises only when the teaching of a thinker or a reformer
affects the frontiers of the faith of Islam. Unfortunately, this question
does arise in connection with the teachings of Qadianism. It must be pointed
out here that the Ahmadi movement is divided into two camps known as the
Qadianis and the Lahoris. The former openly declare the founder to be a full
prophet; the latter, either by conviction or policy, have found it advisable
to preach an apparently toned down Qadianism. However, the question whether
the founder of Ahmadism was a prophet the denial of whose mission entails
what I call the "major heresy" is a matter of dispute between the two
sections. It is unnecessary for my purposes to judge the merits of this
domestic controversy of the Ahmadis. I believe, for reasons to be explained
presently, that the idea of a full-prophet whose denial entails the denier's
excommunication from Islam is essential to Ahmadism; and that the present
head of the Qadianis is far more consistent with the spirit of the movement
than the Imam of the Lahoris.
The cultural value of the idea of Finality in Islam I have fully explained
elsewhere, Its meaning is simple: No spiritual surrender to any human being
after Muhammad who emancipated his followers by giving them a law which is
realizable as arising from the very core of human conscience. Theologically,
the doctrine is that: the socio-political Organization called "Islam" is
perfect and eternal. No revelation the denial of which entails heresy is
possible after Muhammad. He who claims such a revelation is a traitor to
Islam. Since the Qadianis believe the founder of the Ahmadiyyah movement to
be the bearer of such a revelation, they declare that the entire world of
Islam is infidel. The founder's own argument, quite worthy of a medieval
theologian, is that the spirituality of the Holy Prophet of Islam must be
regarded as imperfect if it is not creative of another prophet. He claims
his own prophethood to be an evidence of the prophet-rearing power of the
spirituality of the Holy Prophet of Islam. But if you further ask him whether
the spirituality of Muhammad is capable of rearing more prophets than one,
his answer is "No". This virtually amounts to saying: "Muhammad is not the
last Prophet: I am the last." Far from understanding the cultural value of
the Islamic idea of finality in the history of mankind generally and of Asia
especially, he thinks that finality in the sense that no follower of Muhammad
can ever reach the status of prophethood is a mark of imperfection in
Muhammad's prophethood. As I read the psychology of his mind he, in the
interest of his own claim to prophethood, avails himself of what he describes
as the creative spirituality of the Holy Prophet of Islam and, at the same
time, deprives the Holy Prophet of his "finality" by limiting the creative
capacity of his spirituality to the rearing of only one prophet, i.e, the
founder of the Ahmadiyyah movement. In this way does the new prophet quietly
steal away the "finality" of one whom he claims to be his spiritual
progenitor.
He claims to be a buruz of the Holy Prophet of Islam insinuating there by
that, being a buruz of him, his "finality" is virtually the "finality" of
Muhammad; and that this view of the matter, therefore, does not violate, the
"finality" of the Holy Prophet. In identifying the two finalities, his own
and that of the Holy Prophet, he conveniently loses sight of the temporal
meaning of the idea of Finality. It is, however, obvious that the word buruz,
in the sense even of complete likeness, cannot help him at all; for the buruz
must. always remain the other side of its original. Only in the sense of
reincarnation a buruz becomes identical with the original. Thus if we take
the word buruz to mean "like in spiritual qualities" the argument remains
ineffective; if, on the other hand, we take it to mean reincarnation of the
original in the Aryan sense of the word, the argument becomes plausible; but
its author turns out to be only a Magian in disguise.
It is further claimed on the authority of the great Muslim mystic, Muhyuddin
ibn Arabi of Spain, that it is possible for a Muslim saint to attain, in his
spiritual evolution, to the kind of experience characteristic of the
prophetic consciousness. I personally believe this view of Shaikh Muhyuddin
ibn Arabi to be psychologically unsound; but assuming it to be correct the
Qadiani argument is based on a complete misunderstanding of his exact
position. The Shaikh regards it as a purely private achievement which does
not, and in the nature of things cannot, entitle such a saint to declare that
all those who do not believe in him are outside the pale of Islam. Indeed,
from the Shaikh's point of view, there may be more than one-saint, living in
the same age or country, who may attain to prophetic consciousness. The
point to be seized is that, while it is psychologically possible for a saint
to attain to prophetic experience, his experience will have no
socio-political significance making him the center of a new Organization and
entitling him to declare this Organization to be the criterion of the faith
or disbelief of the followers of Muhammad.
Leaving his mystical psychology aside I am convinced from a careful study of
the relevant passages of the Futuhat that the great Spanish mystic is as firm
a believer in the Finality of Muhammad as any orthodox Muslim. And if he had
seen in his mystical vision that one day in the East some Indian amateurs in
Sufism would seek to destroy the Holy Prophet's finality under cover of his
mystical psychology, he would have certainly anticipated the Indian Ulama in
warning the Muslims of the world against such traitors to Islam.
II
Coming now to the essence of Ahmadism. A discussion of its sources and of
the way in which pre-Islamic Magian ideas have, through the channels of
Islamic mysticism, worked on the mind of its author would be extremely
interesting from the standpoint of comparative religion. It is, however,
impossible for me to undertake this discussion here. Suffice it to say that
the real nature of Ahmadism is hidden behind the mist of medieval mysticism
and theology. The Indian Ulama, therefore, took it to be a purely theological
movement and came out with theological weapons to deal with it. I believe,
however, that this was not the proper method of dealing with the movement;
and that the success of the Ulama was, therefore, only partial. A careful
psychological analysis of the revelations of the founder would perhaps be an
effective method of dissecting the inner life of his personality. In this
connection, I may mention Maulvi Manzur Elahi's collection of the founder's
revelations which offers rich and varied material for psychological research.
In my opinion the book provides a key to the character and personality of
the founder and I do hope that one day some young student of modern
psychology will take it up for serious study. If he takes the Qur'an for his
criterion, as he must for reasons which cannot be explained here, and extends
his study to a comparative examination of the experiences of the founder of
the Ahmadiyyah movement and contemporary non-Muslim mystics, such as Rama
Krishna of Bengal, he is sure to meet more than one surprise as to the
essential character of the experience on the basis of which prophethood is
claimed for the originator of Ahmadism.
Another equally effective and more fruitful method, from the standpoint of
the plain man, is to understand the real content of Ahmadism in the light of
the history of Muslim theological thought in India at least from the year
1799. The year 1799 is extremely important in the history of the world of
Islam. In this year fell Tippu, and his fall meant the extinguishing of the
Muslim hopes for political prestige in India. In the same year was fought
the battle of Navarneo which saw the destruction of the Turkish fleet.
Prophetic were the words of the author of the chronogram of Tippu's fall
which visitors of Serangapatam find engraved on the wall of Tippu's
mausoleum: "Gone is the glory of India as well of Roum." Thus, in the year
1799, the political decay of Islam in Asia reached its climax. But just as
out of the humiliation of Germany on the day of Jena arose the modern German
nation, it may be said with equal truth that out of the political humiliation
of Islam in the year 1799 arose modern Islam and her problems. This point I
shall explain in the sequel. For the present I want to draw the reader's
attention to some of the questions which have arisen in Muslim India since
the fall of Tippu and the development of European imperialism in Asia.
Does the idea of Caliphate in Islam embody a religious institution? How are
the Indian Muslims, and for the matter of that all Muslims outside the
Turkish Empire, related to the Turkish Caliphate? Is India Dar-ul-Harb or
Dar-ul-Islam? What is the real meaning of the doctrine of Jihad in Islam?
What is the meaning of the expression "From amongst you" in the Qur'anic
verse: "Obey God, obey the Prophet and the masters of the affair, i.e.
rulers, from amongst you"? What is the character of the Traditions of the
Prophet foretelling the advent of Imam Mahdi? These questions and some
others which arose subsequently were, for obvious reasons, questions for
Indian Muslims only. European imperialism, however, which was then rapidly
penetrating the world of Islam, was also intimately interested in them. The
controversies which these questions created form a most interesting chapter
in the history of Islam in India. The story is a long one and is still
waiting for a powerful pen. Muslim politicians whose eyes were mainly fixed
on the realities of the situation succeeded in winning over a section of the
Ulama to adopt a line of theological argument which as they thought suited
the situation; but it was not easy to conquer by mere logic the beliefs which
had ruled for centuries the conscience of the masses of Islam in India . In
such a situation, logic can either proceed on the ground of political
expediency or on the lines of a fresh orientation of texts and traditions. In
either case, the argument will fail to appeal to the masses. To the
intensely religious masses of Islam only one thing can make a conclusive
appeal, and that is Divine Authority. For an effective eradication of
orthodox beliefs it was found necessary to find a revelational basis for a
politically suitable orientation of theological doctrines involved in the
questions mentioned above. This revelational basis is provided by Ahmadism.
And the Ahmadis themselves claim this to be the greatest service rendered by
them to British imperialism. The prophetic claim to a revelational basis for
theological views of a political significance amounts to declaring that those
who do not accept the claimant's views are infidels of the first water and
destined for the flames of Hell. As I understand the significance of the
movement, the Ahmadi belief that Christ died the death of an ordinary mortal,
and that his second advent means only the advent of a person who is
spiritually "like unto him," give the movement some sort of a rational
appearance; but they are not really essential to the spirit of the movement.
In my opinion, they are only preliminary steps towards the idea of full
prophethood which alone can serve the purposes of the movement eventually
brought into being by new political forces. In primitive countries it is not
logic but authority that appeals. Given a sufficient amount of ignorance,
credulity which strangely enough sometimes coexists with good intelligence,
and a person sufficiently audacious to declare himself a recipient of Divine
revelation whose denial would entail eternal damnation, it is easy, in a
subject Muslim country to invent a political theology and to build a
community whose creed is political servility. And in the Punjab, even an
ill-woven net of vague theological expressions can easily capture the
innocent peasant who has been for centuries exposed to all kinds of
exploitation. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru advises the orthodox of all religions
to unite and thus to delay the coming of what he conceives to be Indian
Nationalism. This ironical advice assumes that Ahmadism is a reform movement:
he does not know that as far as Islam in India is concerned, Ahmadism
involves both religious and political issues of the highest importance. As I
have explained above, the function of Ahmadism in the history of Muslim
religious thought is to furnish a revelational basis for India's present
political subjugation. Leaving aside the purely religious issues, on the
ground of political issues alone it does not lie in the mouth of a man like
Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru to accuse Indian Muslims of reactionary
conservatism. I have no doubt that if he had grasped the real nature of
Ahmadism he would have very much appreciated the attitude of Indian Muslims
towards a religious movement which claims Divine authority for the woes of
India.
Thus the reader will see that the pallor of Ahmadism which we find on the
cheeks of Indian Islam today is not an abrupt phenomenon in the history of
Muslim religious thought in India. The ideas which eventually shaped
themselves in the form of this movement became prominent in theological
discussions long before the founder of Ahmadism was born. Nor do I mean to
insinuate that the founder of Ahmadism and his companions deliberately
planned their programme. I dare say the founder of the Ahmadiyyah movement
did hear a voice; but whether this voice came from the God of Life and Power
or arose out of the spiritual impoverishment of the people must depend upon
the nature of the movement which it has created and the kind of thought and
emotion which it has given to those who have listened to it. The reader must
not think that I am using metaphorical language. The life-history of nations
shows that when the tide of life in a people begins to ebb, decadence itself
becomes a source of inspiration, inspiring their poets, philosophers, saints,
statesmen, and turning them into a class of apostles whose sole ministry is
to glorify, by the force of a seductive art or logic, all that is ignoble and
ugly in the life of their people. These apostles unconsciously clothe despair
in the glittering garment of hope, undermine the traditional values of
conduct and thus destroy the spiritual virility of those who happen to be
their victims. One can only imagine the rotten state of a people's will who
are, on the basis of Divine authority, made to accept their political
environment as final. Thus, all the actors who participated in the drama of
Ahmadism were, I think, only innocent instruments in the hands of decadence.
A similar drama had already been acted in Persia; but it did not lead, and
could not have led, to the religious and political issues which Ahmadism has
created for Islam in India. Russia offered tolerance to Babism and allowed
the Babis to open their first missionary center in Ishqabad. England showed
Ahmadism the same tolerance in allowing them to open their first missionary
center in Woking. Whether Russia and England showed this tolerance on the
ground of imperial expediency or pure broadmindedness is difficult for us to
decide. This much is absolutely clear that this tolerance has created
difficult problems for Islam in Asia. In view of the structure of Islam, as I
understand it, I have not the least doubt in my mind that Islam will emerge
purer out of the difficulties thus created for her. Times are changing.
Things in India have already taken a new turn. The new spirit of democracy
which is coming to India is sure to disillusion the Ahmadis and to convince
them of the absolute futility of their theological inventions.
Nor will Islam tolerate any revival of medieval mysticism which has already
robbed its followers of their healthy instincts and given them only obscure
thinking in return. It has, during the course of the past centuries,
absorbed the best minds of Islam leaving the affairs of the State to mere
mediocrity. Modern Islam cannot afford to repeat the experiment. Nor can it
tolerate a repetition of the Punjab experiment of keeping Muslims occupied
for half a century in theological problems which had absolutely no bearing on
life. Islam has already passed into the broad day light of fresh thought and
experience, and no saint or prophet can bring it back to the fogs of medieval
mysticism...
[From the Book: Islam and Ahmadim, Dawah Academy, international Islamic University, Islamabad]
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